RNN-based Early Cyber-Attack Detection for the Tennessee Eastman Process by Filonov, Pavel et al.
RNN-based Early Cyber-Attack Detection for the Tennessee Eastman Process
Pavel Filonov 1 Fedor Kitashov 1 Andrey Lavrentyev 1
Abstract
An RNN-based forecasting approach is used
to early detect anomalies in industrial multi-
variate time series data from a simulated Ten-
nessee Eastman Process (TEP) with many cyber-
attacks. This work continues a previously pro-
posed LSTM-based approach to the fault detec-
tion in simpler data. It is considered necessary
to adapt the RNN network to deal with data con-
taining stochastic, stationary, transitive and a rich
variety of anomalous behaviours. There is partic-
ular focus on early detection with special NAB-
metric. A comparison with the DPCA approach
is provided. The generated data set is made pub-
licly available.
1. Introduction
Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) deals with mul-
tivariate time series data of technological processes: sen-
sors and controls signals. Comprising a cyber components,
ICSs are a target of cyber-attacks (for example (Lee et al.,
2014)), that can modify sensor and controls values, or the
parameters of control logic (set points). Such cyber-attacks
can be detected as an anomalies in technological signals.
This raises the issue of early anomaly detection.
Different approaches have been proposed to detect anoma-
lies in industrial data. Anomalies can arise for different rea-
sons, besides cyber-attacks: equipment malfunctions, hu-
man errors, analogous signals interruptions, etc. Here we
provide only a short overview of such approaches: RNN-
based (Nanduri et al., 2016), LSTM-based forecasting
(Filonov et al., 2016; Malhotra et al., 2015) and encoder-
decoder (Malhotra et al., 2016), clustering based (Kiss
et al., 2015), PCA, DPCA, FDA, DFDA, CVA, PLS (Chi-
ang et al., 2001), one-class SVM and segmentation (Marti
et al., 2015), change point detection (Matteson & James,
2013), process invariants (Adepu & Mathur, 2016).
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One of the main problems with the verification of proposed
approaches is the lack of available industrial datasets with
labelling of normal and anomalous behaviour as well as
the absence of rich anomalous behaviour examples. Find-
ing data from real objects under cyber-attacks is problem-
atic because these are quite unique incidences and industry
vendors do not want to share such data. Experimenting
with attacks on real test objects is not a solution because it
is very costly. One of a possibility for generating anoma-
lous behaviour is data augmentation as in (Yadav et al.,
2016). Another possibility is to use a mathematical model
of a cyber-physical system for both physics and control dy-
namics and simulate multiple realistic cyber-attacks. In our
previous work (Filonov et al., 2016) we used this approach
with a gasoil heating loop process (GHL) (GHL, 2016)
implemented with the Modelica tool. The generated data
is quite rich but it lacks of some stochastic properties and
reflects a rather simple control logic.
In the current paper we use the well-known TEP model
(Downs & Vogel, 1993; Ricker, 2013) which allows rich
and realistic datasets to be generated. Cyber-attack sim-
ulation using TEP was proposed in (Krotofil, 2014) and
implemented in the Matlab/Simulink tool and .NET code.
We used our own implementation of the TEP model com-
pletely in Python code which allowed us to simulate a lot of
cyber-attacks and generate datasets as well as a streaming
data.
To detect anomalies in TEP data we further developed the
RNN-based forecasting approach that we used for GHL
data. TEP data requires the RNN network to be adapted in
order to deal with stochasticity, stationary and transitive be-
haviours. We also focused more on early detection and for
this purpose used Numenta Anomaly Benchmark (NAB)
metric (Lavin & Ahmad, 2015). We provide a compari-
son with the fault detection approach traditionally used for
TEP based on DPCA (Chiang et al., 2001), and which we
combined here with the NAB-metric.
2. Dataset Description
The TEP model is represented in Figure 1. It was simulated
at different normal modes and under cyber-attacks. The
generated datasets characteristics are represented in Table
1.
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Figure 1. Tennessee Eastman Process
We generated a training dataset with 201 single-mode and
336 transient-mode samples and a test dataset with 142
MEAS/MV/SP attacks samples (TEP, 2017). Each sam-
ple is a multivariate time series of dimension 59. Besides
samples for 7 single modes of TEP operation we generated
samples for 28 transient modes via 4 variants of SP changes
for each single mode: decreasing by 2% catalyst C purge,
changing product mix by 10%, decreasing product rate by
15%, decreasing reactor pressure by 1− 2%. Indicators of
attacks in the test dataset are equal to 1.0 at the intervals of
corresponding attacks (to MEAS, MV or SP). There were
three kinds of attacks used at the MEAS and MV: a) In-
tegrity: changing a value to something different from that
simulated by the TEP-model, b) DoS (denial of service): at
some point a value of a variable is frozen for the duration
of an attack, c) Noise: add nose to value.
An attack on an industrial plant can very quickly reach a
critical situation where further model simulation becomes
impossible and the plant operation must be stopped. In or-
der not to make the task of detection too simple, we tuned
the attack intervals so that the plant could return to a level
of stable operation after an attack, and proposed four series
of attacks.
3. RNN-based Anomaly Detection
We use RNN-based forecasting model. Anomaly detection
is made on the base of MSE (mean square error) between
prediction and observation.
3.1. Pre- and Post- Processing
Input data is normalized (parameters are calculates based
on the training dataset).
Prediction square error is summarised and smoothed with
EMWA. Smoothing factor α is calculated using the size of
59 Time Series Dimension
41 sensors (MEAS - measurements)
12 controls (MV - manipulated variables)
1 MEAS attack indicator
1 MV attack indicator
1 SP (set point) attack indicator
3 special variables (state, product rate, hourly cost)
Plant Modes
7 normal modes
28 transient modes
Attack Types
DoS (value is frozen)
Integrity (value is changed)
Noise (value + noise)
Attack Series (#, Type, MV/MEAS/SP, duration)
#21: Integrity: MEAS ”reactor temperature”,
0.012-0.027 h
#22: DoS: MV ”Stripper liquid product flow”,
MEAS ”Stripper level”,
MEAS ”Stripper underfow”, 5.663-25.019 h
#23: DoS: MV ”D feed flow”, 10 h
#24: Noise: MV ”C feed flow”, MV ”Purge flow”,
MEAS ”Stripper underfow”,
MV ”Stripper steam flow”, 7.727 - 71.291 h
1000 Points per Hour
Training set (duration hours)
201 samples with one normal mode (120 h)
336 samples with transient mode (120 h)
Test set (duration hours)
142 samples with attacks ( ≤ 120 h, till broken)
Table 1. TEP dataset characteristics
input window w as α = 1− exp (− ln 2w ).
The minimal detection threshold value is calculated as
0.999 quantile from the smoothed error in the training
dataset.
3.2. RNN Architecture and Training
To cope with the TEP dataset, we adopted the previously
used LSTM architecture for the GHL dataset in a way that
is represented in Table 2.
For both datasets we use stacked RNN with 2 hidden layers,
each with 64 cells. The input window is equal to the pre-
diction window. ReLU as an activation function for hidden
layers and linear activation function for the output layer are
used.
To train RNN we use MSE loss-function and the RMSProp
algorithm. Learning step equals 0.001. Number of epochs
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Dataset Cell Layer Memory Dropout Window
GHL LSTM 2x64 stateful 0.1 120
TEP GRU 2x64 stateless no 100
Table 2. RNN architecture for GHL and TEP datasets
equals 100. Average time of one training epoch is 70 sec-
onds with batch size = 2048 and hardware Tesla P40, In-
tel Xeon CPU E5-2650 v4 2.20GHz. The resulting depen-
dency of loss-functions vs epoch for training and validation
datasets is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Loss-function value vs epoch number for training (loss)
and validation (val-loss) datasets
Examples of trained RNN model prediction for a single
mode normal behaviour sample is represented in Figure 3,
for a transient mode sample in Figure 4, and for an MEAS
attack sample in Figure 5.
3.3. Quality Metric
To compare the results of different anomaly detection ap-
proaches we selected the NAB-metric that scores in range
s ∈ [−1.0, 1.0] (s = 1.0 if detection is at the anomaly
beginning, s = 0.0 if detection is at the end of anomaly
window, s ∈ (−1.0, 0.0) if detection is not too far from
the end of anomaly window, s = −1.0 otherwise). Table 3
shows standard profile weights (Lavin & Ahmad, 2015)
for TP, TN, FP, FN for the NAB-metric.
Positive Negative
True 1.0 1.0
False 0.11 1.0
Table 3. Standard profile weights for the NAB-metric
Figure 3. Example of RNN prediction (green) for a single mode
normal behaviour sample
Experimenting with different kinds of attacks on the TEP
we observed that the anomaly window is not necessary
equal to the attack interval. Quite often the consequence of
an attack, which is also anomalous behaviour, continues af-
ter the attack has stopped. So, selecting a correct anomaly
window for the NAB metric is quite a tricky process. To
average this out we use an anomaly window equal to twice
the attack interval.
The RNN-based detector was tested under different detec-
tion thresholds. Several cyber-attacks datasets were con-
catenated in one.
3.4. Comparison with DPCA
Working with the GHL dataset we found that the most suc-
cessful alternative to the LSTM-based approach is PCA.
Here we compare our RNN-based approach with dynamic
PCA (DPCA).
DPCA parameters are: time window size - 10; space di-
mension - 590; number of main components - 19 (Kaiser
rule λ > 1.0).
With DPCA we were only able to train separate models for
each TEP single operation mode. For transient mode we
faced with many false positives (FP) detection with DPCA.
So, we ignored that cases and calculated scores for DPCA
as an average of the scores for each single mode (m):
DPCA =
6∑
m=0
DPCA(m)
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Figure 4. Example of RNN prediction (green) for a transient
mode normal behaviour sample
We tested RNN and DPCA on the TEP dataset using the
NAB-metric. Anomalies detections results are shown in
Table 4.
Method (attacks series) NAB-score
Ideal detector 1.000
RNN (all) 0.373
DPCA (all) 0.086
RNN (except #23) 0.803
DPCA (except #23) 0.649
Table 4. RNN vs DPCA NAB-scores
We connect the decrease in the RNN and DPCA detection
score in the NAB-metric for attacks on MV #23 (”D-feed
flow DoS”) with the TEP physics, i.e. the consequences of
control changes taking place for quite a long time after an
attack.
4. Conclusion
The RNN-based approach with GRU stateless cells and
without dropout is capable of effectively dealing with
stochasticity, stationarity, transient and anomalous be-
haviour in a realistic TEP dataset. The NAB-metric makes
it possible to validate the model for early detection. A com-
parison with DPCA shows that the RNN-based approach
has better scores for MEAS and SP attacks. Attacks on
MV are detected with RNN with some delay, which we ex-
plain by the longer anomaly window of the consequences
of such attacks. We also found that DPCA model can be
Figure 5. Example of RNN prediction (green) for an MEAS-
attack sample
trained only for a separate single mode, and for a transient
mode DPCA gives many false positives (FP). From a prac-
tical point of view of industrial anomaly detection applica-
tion, it is more convenient to have one trained model for
all kinds of plant modes, what we achieved only with RNN
approach.
The generated TEP datasets with normal and anomalous
behaviour caused by cyber-attacks are made publicly avail-
able.
Acknowledgements
The authors are sincerely grateful to Konstantin Kiselev for
the implementation of the TEP model on Python and Artem
Vorontsov for useful discussions.
This work was supported by the Kaspersky Lab.
References
Gasoil Heating Loop dataset, 2016. URL https://
kas.pr/ics-research/dataset_ghl_1.
Tennessee Eastman Process with cyber-attacks dataset,
2017. URL https://kas.pr/ics-research/
dataset_tep_59.
Adepu, Sridhar and Mathur, Aditya P. Detecting multi-
point attacks in a water treatment system using intermit-
tent control actions. In Proceedings of the Singapore
Cyber-Security Conference (SG-CRC), volume 14, pp.
RNN-based Early Cyber-Attack Detection for the Tennessee Eastman Process
59–74, 2016. URL http://ebooks.iospress.
nl/publication/42053.
Chiang, L H, Russell, E L, and Braatz, R D.
Fault detection and diagnosis in industrial sys-
tems. Measurement Science and Technology, 12(10):
1745, 2001. URL http://stacks.iop.org/
0957-0233/12/i=10/a=706.
Downs, J and Vogel, E. A plant-wide industrial process
control problem. Computers & chemical engineering,
17(3):245–255, 1993.
Filonov, P, Lavrentyev, A, and Vorontsov, A. Multivariate
industrial time series with cyber-attack simulation: Fault
detection using an lstm-based predictive data model.
NIPS 2016 Time Series Workshop papers, 2016. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1612.06676.
Kiss, Istvan, Haller, Piroska, and Berea, Adela. Denial of
service attack detection in case of Tennessee Eastman
Challenge Process. Procedia Technology, 19:835 – 841,
2015. 8th International Conference Interdisciplinarity
in Engineering, INTER-ENG 2014, 9-10 October 2014,
Tirgu Mures, Romania.
Krotofil, M. Damn vulnerable chemical process,
2014. URL http://github.com/satejnik/
DVCP-TE.
Lavin, A and Ahmad, Subutai. Evaluating real-time
anomaly detection algorithms - the Numenta Anomaly
Benchmark. CoRR, abs/1510.03336, 2015. URL http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1510.03336.
Lee, Robert M., Assante, Michael J., and Conway, Tim.
ICS CP/PE (Cyber-to-Physical or Process Effects) case
study paper - German Steel Mill Cyber Attack, Dec
2014. URL https://ics.sans.org/media/
ICS-CPPE-case-Study-2-German-Steelworks_
Facility.pdf. ICS Defense Use Case (DUC).
Malhotra, Pankaj, Vig, Lovekesh, Shroff, Gautam, and
Agarwal, Puneet. Long Short Term Memory networks
for Anomaly Detection in time series. In 23rd Euro-
pean Symposium on Artificial Neural Networks, Compu-
tational Intelligence and Machine Learning., April 2015.
Malhotra, Pankaj, Ramakrishnan, Anusha, Anand, Gau-
rangi, Vig, Lovekesh, Agarwal, Puneet, and Shroff, Gau-
tam. LSTM-based encoder-decoder for multi-sensor
anomaly detection. CoRR, abs/1607.00148, 2016. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.00148.
Marti, Luis, Sanchez-Pi, Nayat, Molina, Jose Manuel, and
Garcia, Ana Cristina Bicharra. Anomaly detection based
on sensor data in petroleum industry applications. Sen-
sors, 15(2):2774, 2015.
Matteson, David S and James, Nicholas A. A nonparamet-
ric approach for multiple change point analysis of mul-
tivariate data. Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation, 109(505): 0:334–345, 2013. URL https:
//arxiv.org/abs/1306.4933v2.
Nanduri, Anvardh, Candidate, M S, and Sherry, Lance.
Anomaly detection in aircraft data using recurrent neural
networks (rnn). 2016.
Ricker, N Lawrence. Tennessee Eastman Chal-
lenge Archive, May 2013. URL http:
//depts.washington.edu/control/LARRY/
TE/download.html.
Yadav, Mohit, Malhotra, Pankaj, Vig, Lovekesh, Sriram,
K., and Shroff, Gautam. ODE - augmented training
improves anomaly detection in sensor data from ma-
chines. CoRR, abs/1605.01534, 2016. URL http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1605.01534.
